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LET US NOW PRAISE FAMOUS JUDGES: EXPLORING
THE ROLES OF JUDICIAL "INTUITION" AND
"ACTIVISM" IN AMERICAN LAW
Rodney A. Smolla *
In contemplating Judge Robert R. Merhige's career as a judge,
I have been struck by how often I have heard his law clerks and
the lawyers who appeared in his courtroom remark on the extent
to which Judge Merhige seemed self-confidently guided by his
"judicial intuition" as to how a pending matter ought to be resolved.
We live in a time in American history in which there is an escalating debate over the role of judges in our society, a debate often
cast in the vocabulary of slings and arrows aimed malevolently at
"judicial activists." My purpose in this essay is to explore this critique of "judicial activism," contrasting and comparing it with the
role of "judicial intuition" in American law, taking as exemplar
and foil the remarkable career of Judge Merhige.
Activists Anonymous
For about as long as I can remember there has been a brouhaha in America over judges who abuse their judicial power by
failing to "follow the law." The usual sneer-word for this is "judicial activism," a shorthand for "making up the law" instead of
"following the law." The label "activist" usually connotes a judge
who cheats. If the judge were just to "follow the law" in a particular case, the judge would be forced to reach conclusion "x." But
conclusion "x" strikes the judge as unjust, or unfair, according to
the judge's own subjective moral, religious, or political views. And
so the judge looks for a way to reach conclusion "y," the very opposite of "x."
* Dean and George E. Allen Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law.
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This attack on activism often comes from politicians-from
presidents, senators, congressmen, governors, or mayors. These
political officials typically see it as their job to be the activists in
society-that is to say, to be the legitimate agents of legal change.
It is okay for a senator or president to act to change the law, because that is their job, and they are accountable to the people. In
a democracy, the argument goes, law should be changed by majority vote. The politicians represent the people and the votes of politicians reflect the will of the democracy. Judges have no business
interfering.
This critique of judicial activism also comes from other quarters. Public interest "activists," the people who power lobby
groups, political action committees, special interests, thus often
decry judicial activism. So do others in the chattering classesthe vocal hoards of lawyers, professors, journalists, columnists,
writers, talk radio hosts, internet bloggers, television paneliststhose who comprise the great maw of pundits and pontificators
who populate modern public discourse. Many of these folks are
themselves activists. They are passionately engaged in debate
over American politics, culture, morality, and law, actively seeking to advance their own views of right and wrong, wisdom, or
folly.
Yet again, however, American orthodoxy is that these are legitimate activists, properly licensed for the work, as James Bond
is licensed to kill. This is the laudable activism of argument and
persuasion, the means by which citizens in a democratic republic
attempt to persuade one another to generate a consensus backed
by a majority vote.
Perhaps most interesting are the anti-activist judges, those
who reproach other judges for their activism. These judges are
convinced that their colleagues are making up the law, imposing
their own subjective views on the populace, thereby lacking the
integrity, self-restraint, and self-discipline, to "follow the law,"
whether or not they find the results that follow pleasing.
Attacks on judicial activism are fueled in part by the passions
that surround certain especially controversial issues in American
life. Liberals may attack conservative judges for activism in advancing a conservative agenda in judicial rulings, such as deci-
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sions awarding the presidency to George Bush over Al Gore,'
shifting power from the federal government to the states, 2 or approving the death penalty.3 In turn, conservatives may attack liberal judges for activism in advancing a liberal agenda in judicial
5
rulings, such as decisions on abortion,4 gay and lesbian rights, or
6
affirmative action.
At times the rhetoric against judicial activism would lead one
to believe that it has become a veritable epidemic, a spreading
contagion undermining the whole American system. Yet curiously, in all my years as a lawyer, I have never met a selfproclaimed judicial activist. You'd think with all this activism
running rampant, one would run across an occasional confession.
Shoot, you would expect to find chapters of "activist's anonymous"
in every state and federal jurisdiction. (The meetings would begin: "Hello, I'm Judge Joe Schmo, and I'm a judicial activist. Hello
Joe Schmo!")
In my years of law, never once have I heard a judge say, "My
notion of what it means to be a judge is that you impose your own
political views on others, pretending to follow the law. I just do
what I think is right, according to my own subjective sense of justice, morality, and political wisdom. Then I fancy it up as 'the
law.
Every judge I have ever known insists with steadfast sincerity
that he or she would never dream of imposing his or her subjective preferences on the outcomes of cases. Judges all claim that
what they do is "follow the law," as best they can determine it,
whether or not they agree with what the law is. The law is the
law.
So what are we to make of this dissonance? What do we make
of the fact that there is so much complaining about activism, but
no owning up? I suppose it could be a massive cover-up, a mammoth ruse being perpetrated on the American people. This is an

1. See generally Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
2. See generally Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (Tenth Amendment);
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (Eleventh Amendment); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (Commerce Clause).
3. See generally Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350 (1993).
4. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
5. See generally Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
6. See generally Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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improbable explanation, however. A contrary possibility is far
more plausible. I think that what may well be at issue here is not
"activism," but "intuition."
The Role of Intuition in Judging
If there are no self-confessed activists to be found, there are
self-confessed "intuitionists." That is to say, there are many
judges and scholars who have argued, over the years, that judging is not an exercise in mathematics, but an exercise in judgment. In turn, the art of "judgment" involves mental and deliberative processes that include, inevitably and fittingly, a role for
intuition.
Intuition in judging, properly understood, is never an end, but
a means. It is not a substitute for sound legal reasoning, but a
means by and through which sound legal reasoning is reached.
Edward Levi, distinguished lawyer, legal scholar, and legal
educator who served as Dean of the University of Chicago, Law
School, and then as that great university's Provost and President,
once noted that the "function of articulated judicial reasoning is
to help protect the Court's moral power by giving some assurance
that private views are not masquerading behind public views."7
Dean Levi's point appears irrefutably correct. To eschew the naked imposition of "private views," however, is not to eschew the
private search for the sound result that is an essential part of any
deep and difficult exercise of judicial power.
While we do not want "judicial activism" on the bench, we do
not want "sterile intellectualism" either. Judge J. Braxton Craven, Jr., a judge who served on the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, once took a shot at sterile intellectualism in law schools, stating derisively in an article published in
the North Carolina Law Review that "[tihere are probably yet
some law professors who think the word 'justice' belongs in Sociology I rather than in Property II. " ' In contrast to this sterile intellectualism, Judge Craven professed admiration for Chief Justice Earl Warren, because Chief Justice Warren made it

7. Edward H. Levi, The Nature of JudicialReasoning, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 395, 409
(1965).
8. J. Braxton Craven, Jr., Paean to Pragmatism,50 N.C. L. REV. 977, 980 (1972).
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9
respectable to ask the elemental question: "Is it fair?" The subjective or indeterminate nature of concepts such as "fairness" or
"justice" was undaunting to Judge Craven: "The legal mind that
will not talk about injustice because it cannot be defined is like a
surgeon who will not treat cancer because it is not yet fully understood."' °

As Oliver Wendell Holmes posed the problem in his classic
work The Common Law, "[tihe very considerations which judges
most rarely mention, and always with an apology, are the secret
root from which the law draws all the juices of life."" Holmes puts
the matter strongly:
Every important principle which is developed in litigation is in fact
and at bottom the result of more or less definitely understood views
of public policy; most generally, to be sure, under our practice and
traditions, the unconscious result of instinctive preferences and inarthe less traceable to views of public
ticulate convictions, but none
12
policy in the last analysis.

These insights are especially apt when the legal dispute involves fundamental questions of constitutional law. Judges dealing with difficult constitutional issues must by necessity employ
all the tools of the trade, always beginning with the constitutional
text in contest, but always including thoughtful consideration of
the surrounding history, tradition, precedent, structure, context,
and function of that text. As the Supreme Court of the United
States recently explained in an important Eighth Amendment
case, "Itihe prohibition against 'cruel and unusual punishments,'
like other expansive language in the Constitution, must be interpreted according to its text, by considering history, tradition, and
precedent, and with due regard for its purpose and function in the
constitutional design."13
Once these tools are added into the mix, some degree of subjectivity, some role for intuitive judgment, must be counted as well.
Consider a series of questions posed by Justice Benjamin Cardozo, in his book The Nature of the JudicialProcess:

9.
10.

Id.
Id. at 980-81.

11.

OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAw 35 (1881).

12.
13.

Id. at 35-36.
Roper v. Simmons, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 1190 (2005).
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What is it that I do when I decide a case? To what sources of information do I appeal for guidance? In what proportions do I permit
them to contribute to the result? In what proportions ought they to
contribute? If a precedent is applicable, when do I refuse to follow it?
If no precedent is applicable, how do I reach the rule that will make
a precedent for the future? If I am seeking logical consistency, the
symmetry of the legal structure, how far shall I seek it? At what
point shall the quest be halted by some discrepant custom, by some
consideration of the social welfare, by my own or the common stan14
dards of justice and morals?

Judge Merhige as Exemplar and Foil
Justice Cardozo's list is especially helpful in considering the
judicial career of Judge Merhige. I had the great privilege of being able to talk to Judge Merhige on many occasions about the art
of judging, including an interview I once conducted for a film
documentary. He had an unflagging reverence for the law, and
would never have characterized himself as an activist. But he
would readily concede that judging involved judgment, and while
he may never have introspectively reduced the process to the precise inventory of questions suggested by Cardozo, in my view
these were precisely the considerations that brought constancy
and integrity to Judge Merhige's rulings, and that earned him
such great respect within our profession.
Judge Merhige was full of spark and sparkle, and undoubtedly
his judgments were often informed by a sparkling flash of intuition that directed him toward a result even before his fine analytic mind had fully puzzled out the rationale. So be it. In one of
the more intellectually honest soul-bearings ever attempted by a
thoughtful jurist, Judge Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr. once wrote:
I, after canvassing all the available material at my command, and
duly cogitating upon it, give my imagination play, and brooding over
the cause, wait for the feeling, the hunch-that intuitive flash of understanding which makes the jump-spark connection between question and decision, and at the point where the path is darkest for the
15
judicial feet, sheds its light along the way.

14. BENJAMIN N. CARDOzo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 10 (1921).
15. Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch"in
JudicialDecision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274, 278 (1929).

ROBERT R. MERHIGE, JR.

20051

These words are apt in describing Judge Merhige's career.
Judge Merhige had a profound impact on the metropolis that is
greater Richmond, on the state, the nation, and the profession. I
doubt that any graduate of the University of Richmond School of
Law ever contributed more. Judge Hutcheson's remarks on judging provide the perfect metaphor for praising Judge Merhige, who
justly deserves to be treated as a hero, as important in his way to
the country as the likes of Holmes or Cardozo. Judge Merhige's
life, "at the point where the path is darkest for the judicial feet,
sheds its light along the way."16

16.

Id.

